[... Three Mile Island] Plant operator Metropolitan Edison’s in-house
health physics staff fled after the incident began, so responsibility
for monitoring radioactive emissions went to a private contractor called
Rad Services.
The company immediately hired Randall Thompson to serve as the health
physics technician in charge of monitoring radioactive emissions, while
Joy Thompson got a job monitoring radiation doses to TMI workers.
What the Thompsons say they found out during their time inside TMI
suggests radiation releases from the plant were hundreds if not
thousands of times higher than the government and industry have
acknowledged — high enough to cause the acute health effects documented
in people living near the plant but that have been dismissed by the
industry and the government as impossible given official radiation dose
estimates. [...]
Read Article
Monday, August 19, 2013
Hope Creek Generating Station, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 - Request for Additional Information Re: Decommissioning Funding Status Report (TAC No. MF2202; MF2227; MF2228)
Hope Creek Generating Station, Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 - Request
for Additional Information Re: Decommissioning Funding Status Report
(TAC No. MF2202; MF2227; MF2228)
Download ML13168A276
Download ML13168A276
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
Commission Approves Publication of Proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic EIS
Greetings —
Today, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved—subject to certain changes that the NRC staff must make—publication of the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement. The Commission’s instructions to staff, in the form of a Staff Requirements Memorandum, are available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2013/2013-0061srm.pdf (ADAMS No. ML13217A358).
The NRC staff will now make the changes directed by the Commission and will publish the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement in September for public comment. The NRC staff will notify members of this e-mail list when publication occurs.
The Commission-review versions of the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement are available at http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/wcd.html. When the staff publishes the proposed rule and draft generic EIS—with changes as directed by the Commission—the staff will post both documents to the Waste Confidence webpage. The staff will also post versions of the documents that identify the changes the NRC staff made in response to the Commission’s Staff Requirements Memorandum.
Public Outreach Update
On Tuesday, July 23, 2013, the Waste Confidence Directorate held an “NRC Chat.” Please visit http://chat.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/07/15/waste-confidence/ to view the discussion.
On Wednesday, August 14, 2013, from 1:30 – 2:30 p.m. EDT, the Waste Confidence Directorate will hold a status teleconference. To participate, please dial 1-800-857-2553, and provide the operator with passcode 3682386. Please dial in 5 minutes before the start time so that all participants can be connected before the teleconference begins. The meeting notice is available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1320/ML13205A393.pdf (ADAMS No. ML13205A393) for more information.
Thank you for your interest in the Waste Confidence environmental review and rulemaking, and we look forward to your participation in the status teleconference on August 14th.
Sincerely,
Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Waste Confidence Directorate
Today, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved—subject to certain changes that the NRC staff must make—publication of the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement. The Commission’s instructions to staff, in the form of a Staff Requirements Memorandum, are available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2013/2013-0061srm.pdf (ADAMS No. ML13217A358).
The NRC staff will now make the changes directed by the Commission and will publish the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement in September for public comment. The NRC staff will notify members of this e-mail list when publication occurs.
The Commission-review versions of the proposed Waste Confidence Rule and Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement are available at http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/wcd.html. When the staff publishes the proposed rule and draft generic EIS—with changes as directed by the Commission—the staff will post both documents to the Waste Confidence webpage. The staff will also post versions of the documents that identify the changes the NRC staff made in response to the Commission’s Staff Requirements Memorandum.
Public Outreach Update
On Tuesday, July 23, 2013, the Waste Confidence Directorate held an “NRC Chat.” Please visit http://chat.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/07/15/waste-confidence/ to view the discussion.
On Wednesday, August 14, 2013, from 1:30 – 2:30 p.m. EDT, the Waste Confidence Directorate will hold a status teleconference. To participate, please dial 1-800-857-2553, and provide the operator with passcode 3682386. Please dial in 5 minutes before the start time so that all participants can be connected before the teleconference begins. The meeting notice is available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1320/ML13205A393.pdf (ADAMS No. ML13205A393) for more information.
Thank you for your interest in the Waste Confidence environmental review and rulemaking, and we look forward to your participation in the status teleconference on August 14th.
Sincerely,
Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Waste Confidence Directorate
A devastating critique of the NRC's recent spent nuclear fuel pool consequence study
August 1, 2013
Cindy Bladey, Chief
Rules, Announcements and Directives Branch, Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Consequence Study, NRC-2013-013
Dear Ms. Bladey:
In response to NRC’s notice at 78 Fed. Reg. 39,781 (July 2, 2013), I am enclosing the Declaration of 1 August 2013 by Gordon R. Thompson: Comments on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Draft Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a US Mark I Boiling Water Reactor. Dr. Thompson’s comments are sponsored by the following environmental organizations: Beyond Nuclear, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Center for a Sustainable Coast, Citizens Allied for Safe Energy, Don’t Waste Michigan, Ecology Party of Florida, Friends of the Coast, Friends of the Earth, Georgia Women’s Action for New Directions, Green States Solutions, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Missouri Coalition for the Environment, NC WARN, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, New England Coalition, No Nukes Pennsylvania, Nuclear Energy Information Service, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Nuclear Watch South, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Public Citizen, Riverkeeper, SEED Coalition, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy.
Download PDF
Cindy Bladey, Chief
Rules, Announcements and Directives Branch, Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
SUBJECT: Comments on Draft Consequence Study, NRC-2013-013
Dear Ms. Bladey:
In response to NRC’s notice at 78 Fed. Reg. 39,781 (July 2, 2013), I am enclosing the Declaration of 1 August 2013 by Gordon R. Thompson: Comments on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Draft Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a US Mark I Boiling Water Reactor. Dr. Thompson’s comments are sponsored by the following environmental organizations: Beyond Nuclear, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Center for a Sustainable Coast, Citizens Allied for Safe Energy, Don’t Waste Michigan, Ecology Party of Florida, Friends of the Coast, Friends of the Earth, Georgia Women’s Action for New Directions, Green States Solutions, Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Missouri Coalition for the Environment, NC WARN, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, New England Coalition, No Nukes Pennsylvania, Nuclear Energy Information Service, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Nuclear Watch South, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Public Citizen, Riverkeeper, SEED Coalition, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Sierra Club Nuclear Free Campaign, and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy.
Download PDF
Online Reference Portal for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of Fukushima Near Term Task Force Related Documents
Online Reference Portal for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Review of Fukushima Near Term Task Force Related Documents
Download ML13206A427
Download ML13206A427
Friday, August 2, 2013
GPU NUCLEAR, lNC., THREE MILE ISLAND STATION, UNIT 2 - NRC I NSPECTION REPORT 05000320/2013008
GPU NUCLEAR, lNC., THREE MILE ISLAND STATION, UNIT 2 - NRC I NSPECTION REPORT 05000320/2013008
Download ML13210A165
Download ML13210A165
Thursday, August 1, 2013
Nuclear Watchdog Group Says the Results of a Hostile Action Drill at Three Mile Island are Grievously Misleading
For Immediate Release: 7/31/2013
Contact: Scott Portzline - Three Mile Island Alert 717-232-8863
Nuclear Watchdog Group Says the Results of a Hostile Action Drill at Three Mile Island are Grievously Misleading
A key element was missed during the hostile action drill at Three Mile Island (TMI). Specifically, emergency responders could be prevented from carrying out their responsibilities if the bridges at TMI are not under the control of the licensee. The control of approach routes was previously an NRC goal during the rule making process in which TMI Alert participated.
Currently the bridges have been in effect, conceded to the terrorists. Guarded and a closed vehicle barriers are needed to control these emergency response routes.
Contact: Scott Portzline - Three Mile Island Alert 717-232-8863
Nuclear Watchdog Group Says the Results of a Hostile Action Drill at Three Mile Island are Grievously Misleading
A key element was missed during the hostile action drill at Three Mile Island (TMI). Specifically, emergency responders could be prevented from carrying out their responsibilities if the bridges at TMI are not under the control of the licensee. The control of approach routes was previously an NRC goal during the rule making process in which TMI Alert participated.
"Limit and control all approach routes."There are only two entrances at Three Mile Island. All travel to the island, the reactors and spent fuel pools is by these two routes which are composed of bridges and roadways. In order to preserve a viable response plan for offsite responders (including fire fighting vehicles etc.) the bridges must be protected at all times.
Also licensees are to “describe the site-specific factors affecting contingency planning”
And that “particular emphasis must be placed on main and alternate entry routes for law enforcement or other offsite support.”
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Currently the bridges have been in effect, conceded to the terrorists. Guarded and a closed vehicle barriers are needed to control these emergency response routes.
Therefore the recent Hostile Action Drill at TMI missed a fundamental component of the reliance upon emergency responders; that is, without response routes, emergency responders would not have a timely means of putting out fires, capturing hostile intruders, assisting with restoring electrical power or controlling the plant and mitigating a loss of coolant event.
Three Mile Island Alert has addressed this issue with the NRC in recent years, and again just this month to no avail. The NRC restated their circuitous position that all local roads are equally important and vulnerable to attack. Therefore they don’t require the bridges to be protected.
"In addition, the Commission has determined that local roads and bridges that are not subject to licensee control are equally important and vulnerable to attack with regards to the capability of offsite support agencies to respond to any site.”
There are many roads leading to TMI but only two which permit access. These must be properly controlled so that emergency plans aren’t rendered ineffectual by terrorists. The drill did not address this issue as part of its evaluation of response planning.
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