PA nuke scrammed

This is misleading because it claims all safety systems responded the way they were supposed to. However the high pressure injection system was inoperable (although not called upon). This is how accident get started.

Power Reactor    Event Number: 51925
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CARL YOUNG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH    Notification Date: 05/13/2016
Notification Time: 05:00 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2016
Event Time: 01:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
SCOTT MORRIS (NRR)
Unit    SCRAM Code    RX CRIT    Initial PWR    Initial RX Mode    Current PWR    Current RX Mode
2    M/R    Y    100    Power Operation    0    Hot Shutdown
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE AFTER LOSS OF AN ESSENTIAL MOTOR CONTROL CENTER

"At approximately 0110 hours [EDT] on May 13, 2016, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor was manually scrammed by plant operators due to a sustained loss of AC power to essential plant loads. Power to MCC 2B246 was lost at 2355 on May 12, 2016, resulting in a loss of Drywell cooling. Drywell pressure increased to 1.3 psig when operators placed the mode switch to the shutdown position to manually SCRAM the reactor. All rods inserted as expected. Reactor water level lowered to -27 inches and was immediately restored by normal feedwater level control. Level 3 (+13 inch) PCIS isolations occurred, along with an initiation of the RCIC system (-30 inches). Once adequate level was verified, RCIC was overridden. Pressure was controlled with turbine bypass valves, and subsequently main steam line drains. All safety systems functioned as expected.
"The power loss also tripped Reactor Building HVAC, causing a loss of secondary containment differential pressure resulting in a loss of safety function.
"Due to the loss of drywell cooling, high drywell pressure actuations and a second reactor SCRAM signal, this signal was automatic, occurred at 0314 hours. HPCI [which automatically initiated on high drywell pressure] was subsequently overridden and declared inoperable, resulting in a loss of safety function. [HPCI did not inject into the vessel].
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Initial reports from the field indicate a phase to phase fault on the MCC 2B246 bus bars."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be issuing a press release.